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Arti￿cial states are those in which political borders do not coincide
with a division of nationalities desired by the people on the ground. We
propose and compute for all countries in the world two new measures how
arti￿cial states are. One is based on measuring how borders split ethnic
groups into two separate adjacent countries. The other one measures how
straight land borders are, under the assumption the straight land borders
are more likely to be arti￿cial. We then show that these two measures seem
to be highly correlated with several measures of political and economic
success.
1 Introduction
Arti￿cial states are those in which political borders do not coincide with a divi-
sion of nationalities desired by the people on the ground. Former colonizers or
post war agreement amongst winners regarding borders have often created mon-
strosities in which ethnic or religious or linguistic groups were thrown together
or separated without any respect for peoples￿aspirations. Eighty per cent of
African borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines and many scholars be-
lieve that such arti￿cial (unnatural) borders which create ethnically fragmented
countries or, conversely, separate into bordering countries the same people, are
at the roots of Africa￿ s economic tragedy.1 Not only in Africa but everywhere
￿We thank Jean Marie Baland, Alberto Bravo-Biosca, Ernesto dal Bo, Ashley Lester, and
participants at conferences at Brown, NBER and a seminar at Harvard for useful comments.
For much needed help with maps we thank Patrick Florance, Kimberly Karish and Michael
Oltmans. Alesina gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from the NSF with a grant trough
NBER.
1See Easterly and Levine (1997) for early econometric work on this point. Herbs (2000) and
especially Englebert Tarango and Carter (2002) focus on the arbitrariness of African borders
as an explanation of politico economic failures in this region. At the time of decolonization,
new rulers in Africa made the decision to keep the borders drawn by former colonizers to avoid
disruptive con￿icts amongst themselves.
2around the globe from Iraq to the Middle East failed states, con￿ ict and eco-
nomic misery often are very visible around borders left over by former colonizers,
borders that had little resemblance to natural division of peoples.
There are three ways in which those who drew borders created problems.
First they gave territories to one group ignoring the fact that another group had
already claimed the same territory. Second, they drew boundaries lines splitting
ethnic (or religious or linguistic) groups into di⁄erent countries, frustrating na-
tional ambitions of various groups and creating unrest in the countries formed.
Third they combined into a single country groups that wanted independence.
The results can be disastrous. Arti￿cial borders increase the motivation to safe-
guard or advance nationalist agendas at the expense of economic and political
development. As George Bernard Shaw eloquently put it "A healthy nation is
as unconscious of its nationality as a healthy man is unconscious of his health.
But if you break a nation￿ s nationality it will think of nothing else but getting
is set again."
While the nature of borders has been mentioned in the political science (es-
pecially) and economic literature, we are not aware of systematic work relating
the nature of country borders to the economic success of countries. Our goal is
to provide measures that proxy for how natural or arti￿cial of borders and relate
them to economic and political development. By arti￿cial we mean a political
border drawn by individuals not living in the areas divided by these borders,
normally former colonizers. All the other borders call them natural, are drawn
by people on the ground. Needless to say often borders start as arti￿cial and
then get modi￿ed by people on the ground. Not only, but adjustments on the
ground may or may not re￿ ect the desire of a majority of the people living there
especially if dictatorial regimes make such adjustments.
We provide two measures never before used in econometric analysis of com-
parative development. One is relatively simple and captures whether or not an
ethnic group is "cut" by a political border line. That is, we measure situations
in which the same ethnic group is present in two bordering countries. This
measure accounts fairly precisely for one of the ways in which borders may be
"wrong", that is when they cut through groups left in separate countries. But
it does not capture other ways in which borders may be undesirable; for in-
stance situations in which two ethnic groups are forced into the same country.
We then provide a second measure, based upon the assumption that if a land
border is close to a straight line it is more likely to be drawn arti￿cially i.e. by
former colonizers; if it is relatively squiggly it is more likely to represent either
geographic features (rivers, mountains etc.) and/or represent divisions carved
out in time to separate di⁄erent people. This second measure probably come
closer to capturing instances in which lines drawn at former colonizers￿tables
have stuck to the ground. The ￿rst measure may also capture adjustments of
borders on the ground that do not re￿ ect an appropriate division of people on
the ground. Needless to say the measure is not perfect but much of our paper
is about precisely discussing this measure and alternatives. It turns out that
these two measures are in fact not highly correlated at all, implying that they
do capture di⁄erent features. For brevity of exposition we de￿ne arti￿cial states
3those that have straight borders and/or have a large fraction of their population
is represented by a group split with a neighboring country.
In many ways the main contribution of the paper is to provide new measures
of borders and divisions of people that can be used for many other purposes,
Here we use then for what may be a ￿rst pass at examining whether they are
correlated with something important to understand politico economic success.
Therefore after we have constructed our measures we explore how they are
correlated with various standard measures of economic development, such as
per capita GDP, institutional success such as freedom, corruption etc., and
measures of quality of life and public services, such as infant mortality, education
etc. Both measures of "arti￿ciality" are correlated with several variables that
measure politico-economic development. Arti￿cial states measured by the two
proxies described above, function much less well than non arti￿cial states. The
correlation of our measures with measures of politico economic success of various
countries are fairly robust to controlling for climate, colonial past and the other
traditional measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
We also checked our measures￿relationship to the occurrence of wars, do-
mestic or international. Our results are just a ￿rst step for further research. A
measure of political instability and violence is indeed correlated with our mea-
sure of arti￿cial states; however we do not ￿nd evidence of correlations between
the number and intensity for wars fought by one country with our measures of
arti￿cial borders.2Future research needs to address these question using data on
bilateral con￿ icts around various types of borders.
Because borders can be changed, as Alesina and Spolaore (1997) emphasized,
citizens can rearrange the borders of arti￿cial states. Indeed this happens; just
look at the breakdown of the Soviet Union. In fact it is quite possible that as
time goes by many currently straight borders will become squiggly as they are
rearranged. Relatively newly independent countries have had "less time" than
countries which have been never colonized to carve their borders as a result
of some sort of equilibrium of re￿ ecting how di⁄erent people want to organize
themselves. With speci￿c reference to Africa, Englebert, Trango and Carter
(2002) document several instances of border instability in Africa due to the
arti￿cial original borders. Even amongst never colonized countries, tensions
remain, think for instance of the Basque independentist movement in Spain.
We are not aware of other papers that have attempted to consider formally
(as opposed to narratively) the shape of countries to economic development,
however our paper is related to three strands of the literature. One strand is the
recent work on the size of countries and its relationship with economic growth,
as in Alesina and Spolaore (2003), Alesina Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), and
Alcala and Ciccone (2004), amongst others. Second, our work builds on the
literature concerning the relationship between ethno-linguistic fractionalization
and economic growth, as in Easterly and Levine (1997) , Alesina et. al. (2003),
and several others. Our paper discusses one historical phenomenon that may
2Other authors as well have not identi￿ed a simple way of relating ethnic con￿icts and civil
wars, see for instance Easterly and Levine (1997) and Fearon and Laitin (2003).
4have led to excess ethnic fractionalization. 3 Third, the role of former colonizers
has also been widely studied (see La Porta et al (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2001) Glaeser et al(2004)) but not speci￿cally with regards to the
importance of borders. Our paper speci￿es a new mechanism by which colonizers
a⁄ected subsequent development. In many ways we bridge these three strands
because we focus on how colonizers have created fragmented societies by drawing
arti￿cial borders.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide historical exam-
ples of the arti￿cial border-drawing. Section 3 describes our basic hypothesis,
presents our measures of arti￿cial borders, and discusses the properties of these
measures. Section 4 investigates whether arti￿cial states indeed perform less
well than other states, by relating our measures of borders to various indicators
of economic and political development. The last section concludes.
2 Examples of problematic borders
Examples of problematic borders abound. Mc Millan (2003) in her analysis of
the post First War meeting at Versailles describes how the redrawing of borders
around the world was decided based on compromises between the winning pow-
ers often with little regards for preserving nationalities. American President
Woodrow Wilson spoke often and eloquently in favor of a nationality principle,
namely that political borders had to respect ethnic boundaries and respect na-
tionality, but that principle was often ignored, including by Woodrow Wilson
himself. The book by Mc Millan clearly documents, sometimes even in an hi-
larious ways, how borders were drawn on maps with strikes of a pencil by the
leaders of England, France and the US, ignoring the leg work of their experts
and without even knowing the names of the ethnicities involved. Historians
agree that the Treaty of Versailles created many problematic borders that set
the seeds for a very large number of future con￿ icts.
The past and current trouble in the Middle East at least in part originated
from this kind of agreement between Western powers. Under the Skyles-Picot
agreement between British and French during WWI, Northern Palestine would
go to the French, Southern Palestine to the British, and Central Palestine in-
cluding Jerusalem would be an allied Condominium shared by the two. After
the war, the French agreed to give up any claims to Palestine in return for
control over Syria. The British abandoned their protegee (Faisal) in Syria and
o⁄ered him Iraq, cobbling together three di⁄erent Ottoman provinces containing
Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis. This set the stage for instability and the military
coups that lead to Saddam Hussein. In Lebanon, the French added Tripoli,
Beirut and Sidon to the traditional Moronite area around Mount Lebanon, giv-
ing their Maronite Christian allies control to what were originally Muslim areas.
The partition of India and Pakistan is another famous example of arti￿cial
borders. The burning issue in the partition of 1947 was whether and how to
award separate rights of national self-determination to Hindus and Muslims
3For a recent survey of this literature see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
5(the British ignored the national aspirations of smaller groups like the Sikhs,
which would bring its own bitter consequences). The Congress Party of Gandhi
and Nehru campaigned for independence for one unitary Indian state, including
Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs from Peshawar to Dhaka. Mohammed Ali Jinnah
founded the Muslim League, which called for a separate state for Muslims:
Pakistan. But since Hindus and Muslims were mixed together all over the
subcontinent, how could you come up with a plan to carve a Muslim nation out
of India?
This intermixing was the result of a complex history that included the Mus-
lim Mughal dynasty that the British Raj replaced. Until the last days of the
Raj, there were Muslim princes ruling over majority Hindu princedoms and
Hindu princes ruling over majority Muslim princedoms. The only areas with a
Muslim majority were in the extreme northwest and the extreme northeast, sep-
arated by a thousand miles, and still containing large minority Sikh and Hindu
communities.
In the Muslim Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), ethnic Pathans were
separated from their fellow Pathans in Afghanistan by the Durand Line, an
arbitrary boundary between Afghanistan and British India laid down by a pre-
vious British bureaucrat. Peshawar, the capital of NWFP, was the traditional
winter home of the Afghan kings. The Pathans preferred either an independent
Pukhtoonwa uniting all Pathans or a Pathan-led Greater Afghanistan. At the
time of Partition, NWFP had a Congress-allied government led by a charismatic
advocate of nonviolence, Khan Abdul Gha⁄ar Khan (the ￿Frontier Gandhi).￿
Back in British India, two other provinces of the future Pakistan were Sindh
and Balochistan. Sindhi feudal landowners initially opposed the Pakistan idea
and only later gave their grudging support under the na￿ve hope that Sindh
would be largely autonomous. Balochi tribesmen (also divided from ethnic com-
patriots by a colonial boundary with Iran) preferred an independent Balochis-
tan, which would lead to a secessionist attempt in the 1970s, met with murder-
ous repression by the Pakistani state. As far as Punjab and Bengal, Congress
leaders would not consent to hand them over to the Muslims. This meant that
the British would partition the mosaic of Hindus and Moslems in each state
(and Sikhs in the Punjab, which was a Sikh state at one point). The Unionist
government in Punjab prior to partition backed neither the Muslim League nor
Congress.
The unhappiest heir of the partition of 1947 is Pakistan. Jinnah complained
that he got a ￿moth-eaten￿Pakistan, with missing halves of Bengal and Pun-
jab, little of Kashmir, some frontier territory, and two disjointed areas of West
and East Pakistan. As late as 1981, only 7 percent of the Pakistani population
were primary speakers of the supposed national language, Urdu. So to sum up,
Pakistan wound up as a collection of Balochistan, NWFP, Sindh (all of whom
entertained secession at various times), East Bengal (which successfully seceded
in 1971 to become Bangladesh, although only after a genocidal repression by
West Pakistani troops), mohajir migrants from India (many of whom regret-
ted the whole thing), and West Punjab (which had its own micro-secessionist
6movement by the Seraiki linguistic minority).4
Besides the examples above, arti￿cial borders were drawn during the colonial
period and few borders changed after decolonization. Africa is the region most
notorious for arbitrary borders. Historian Roel Van Der Veen (2004) points out
that prior to the era of decolonization, states had to prove their control of a
territory before being recognized by the international system. Virtually all new
African states would have failed this test. With decolonization in Africa (and to
some extent in other regions), the leading international powers changed this rule
to recognize nations that existed principally on paper as the heir to a former
colonial demarcation. As Van Der Veen put its, ￿letterbox sovereignty￿ was
conferred upon whatever capital and whichever ruler the letters from the UN,
the IMF, and the World Bank were addressed to. This left the new rulers more
accountable to international organizations and leading industrial powers than
to their purported citizens.5 States consisted of little more than a few former
independence agitators, the indigenous remnant of the colonial army, and a
foreign aid budget. The new rulers of African states had no incentive to change
a system of which they were the main bene￿ciaries, and hence the Organization
of African Unity adopted a convention in the 1960s to treat colonial boundaries
as sacrosanct (only rarely violated since). We refer to Englebert Tarango and
Carter (2002) for have many more examples of problematic borders in Africa
that lead to disputes, political instability and economic failures.
Latin America is a lesser known (and much earlier) example of arti￿cial
borders drawn by a colonial power, in this case Spain. The Spanish created ad-
ministrative units (vice royalties, captaincies, audiencias, etc.) in the Americas
that had virtually nothing to do with indigenous groups on the ground. For
example, the various Mayan groups in southern Mexico, Guatemala, and what
became other Central American states were split between units. The province
of Upper Peru, which later became Bolivia, split the Quechuas between Bolivia
and Peru, and combined the Quechuas with Aymaras in Bolivia. When inde-
pendence arrived in the early 19th century, the new states were controlled by the
European elites who formed states based on these colonial demarcations. In the
words of one historian, ￿the new ￿ sovereign￿states were often little more than
a loose collection of courts, custom houses, and military units.￿(Winn 1992, p.
83). Although there were some wars that altered a few borders, today￿ s Latin
American states still correspond closely to Spanish colonial divisions.
3 Arti￿cial states: hypotheses and measures
Our main hypothesis is that arti￿cial states perform less well than non-arti￿cial
ones. Measure of performance may include indicators of economic and political
development, education, health, public goods delivery, political instability and
violence. Basically our goal is to provide some statistical content to the widely
4These examples are from Easterly (2006).
5Van De Veen (2004), p29
7held view that countries that do not match nationalities well and are a mix of
ethnic or religious group thrown together (or separated) arti￿cially by former
colonizers do not perform well.
The main di¢ culty is of course, to provide a measure of arti￿cial states which
is as much as possible based upon objective criteria rather than judgement calls.
We will use two measures. The ￿rst measures the degree to which ethnic groups
were split by borders, based upon a calculation for each pair of adjacent nations
using detailed data of ethnic groups within nations from Alesina et al. (2003).
The second measure is completely new, and the construction of this measure
per se is, we hope, a signi￿cant contribution in itself; this is the fractal measure
described below.
3.1 The fractal measure
The basic idea is to compare the borders of a country to a geometric ￿gure.
If a country looks like a perfect square with borders drawn with straight lines,
the chances are these borders were drawn arti￿cially. On the contrary, borders
which are coast lines or squiggly lines (perhaps meant to capture geographic
features and/or ethnicities) are less likely to be arti￿cial. Squiggly geographic
lines (like mountains) are likely to separate ethnic groups, for obvious reasons
of patterns of communication and migration.
But how can we measure squiggliness? We ￿rst present the measure and
then we discuss its properties and alternatives.
Fractal dimension is analogous to the typical concept of the dimension of an
object, although, unlike the simple de￿nition of dimension, the fractal dimension
can be a fractional number. A point has a fractal dimension of zero, a straight
line a fractal dimension of one, and a plane a fractal dimension of two. However,
unlike with the traditional de￿nition of dimension, as a line stops being perfectly
straight and begins to meanders more and more, i.e. to become more and more
squiggly, the fractal dimension increases. In the limit that a curve meanders so
much that it essentially ￿lls a whole page, then the fractal dimension becomes
much closer to 2 than to 1. This is because the "line" is behaving more like a
"plane".
Our measure is meant to capture how close a border is to a straight line
which would have a fractal dimension of 1, versus a line so squiggly that ￿lls a
plane and has a fractal dimension of 2. In practice the fractal measure of actual
borders is much closer to 1 than to 2 but there is variation. Figure 1 shows two
countries, Sudan and France. Visually, they are quite di⁄erent, as the borders
of Sudan are very straight and those of France are quite squiggly. It will turn
out that the fractal dimension for France is 1.0429 and that of Sudan is 1.0245,
re￿ ecting the fact that Sudan￿ s borders are much closer to being straight lines
(dimension 1.0000) than France￿ s borders.
The fractal dimension can be calculated in several ways. We use the box-
count method which is the most straightforward; (Peitgen, Jurgens and Saupe
8(1992), p 218-219). For this method, a grid of a certain size/scale is projected
onto the border and the number of boxes which the border crosses is tallied.
The scale of this grid is also recorded, as measured by the length of a side of
one of the boxes in the grid. This gives a pair of numbers: box-count and box-
size. The process is then repeated using grids with di⁄erent box-sizes, each time
recording both the box-size and the number of boxes that the border crosses.
Given the pairs of data, box-size and box-count, the log-log plot of this data
gives the fractal dimension as follows, where the negative of the slope B is the
fractal dimension of the line:
ln (box count) = a + b * ln (box size)
Some intuition for this method can be gained by considering two extreme
cases, a perfectly straight line and a line so wiggly that it covers a whole page
(Figure 2a-2d). Figures2a and 2b show two di⁄erent grids projected onto a
perfectly straight line. The length of the side of a box or the "box size" in
Figure 2a is twice that of Figure 2b and we can normalize the box sizes to 2
and 1, respectively. Counting the number of squares that the line crosses in
each case, we get a box count of 24 for Figure 2a when the box size is 2, and
a box count of 48 for Figure 2b when the box size is 1. Thus, for the straight
line, the box count doubles (or increases by a factor of 21) when the box size is
halved (or "increases" by a factor of 2￿1). Plotting ln(box count) versus ln(box
size) yields a downward-sloping line with a slope of ￿ 1 (Figure 1g and Table 1
). Thus the fractal dimension for the straight line depicted in Figures 2a and
2b is determined to be 1. This makes sense because the fractal dimension is
identical to our normal notion of dimension for perfectly straight lines, planes
and other simple shapes.
Next consider Figures 2c and 2d, which show a line so squiggly that it covers
the whole page. Here the box count is 176 when the box size is 2 (Figure 2c)
and the box count is 704 when the box size is 1 (Figure 2d). Thus the box count
quadruples (increases by a factor of 22) when the box size is halved ("increases"
by a factor of 2￿1). In this case, the plot of ln(box count) versus ln(box size)
yields a downward-sloping line with a slope of 2 / ￿ 1 = ￿ 2 (Figure 2g and Table
1). Consequently, for this line, which is so squiggly that it ￿lls the whole page,
the fractal dimension is 2. This is also in agreement with the standard notion
of dimension in which a plane or a page has two dimensions.
The borders of countries will be in between these two extremes of a perfectly
straight line with fractal dimension 1 and a very squiggly line which ￿lls a whole
page and has a fractal dimension of 2. Consider the somewhat less squiggly line
in Figures 2e and 2f. Here, when we calculate the fractal dimension using the
box counting method, we ￿nd that the box count increases from 54 (Figure
2e) to 130 (Figure 2f) when the box size is reduced from 2 to 1, respectively.
Thus the box count is more than doubling when the box size is halved. But yet
the box count is not quadrupling, as was the case with the very squiggly line
(Figures 2c and 2d). We would thus expect that a plot of ln(box count) versus
ln(box size) would have a slope that is steeper than -1 but not quite a steep
9as -2. In fact, when we do the calculation for this example, the slope is -1.267
(Figure 2g and Table 1). Based on this result, we would a sign a fractal number
of 1.267 to this squiggly line. In practice the fractal dimension of most country
borders is between 1.000 and 1.100. Squiggly borders have fractal dimensions
closer to 1.100, while straighter borders have fractal dimensions closer to 1.000.
These examples use only two data points to determine the fractal dimension
of a line form. In practice, when calculating the fractal dimension of country
borders, we use twelve di⁄erent box sizes. The smallest box size is the smallest
possible, given the digital nature of our data. This smallest box size corresponds
to about 0.001 of a degree latitude or longitude. In addition to this box size,
which we normalize to 1, we also use grids with box sizes of 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 16, 31,
64, 128, 256, and 512. As in the examples above, for each box size, we project
a grid with that box size onto our country border. We then count the number
of boxes that the border crosses, resulting in a data point of box count and box
size. Using all twelve box sizes gives us twelve data points with which to regress
ln(box count) on ln(box size). Recall that the general formula for the fractal
dimension is given by
ln (box count) = (constant intercept) - (fractal dimension) * ln (box size)
Thus, we take the negative of the slope of the regression of ln(box count) on
ln(box size) as the fractal dimension for the country.
It is useful to present an example, using the case of Colombia. Figure 3 shows
our method for determining the fractal dimension for Colombia. The graph
plots ln(box count) versus ln(box size) and has twelve points, corresponding to
the twelve di⁄erent box sizes. For each box size, we have projected a grid of
that size onto the border for Colombia and counted the number of boxes that the
border crosses. Taking logs of this data, we arrive at our twelve data points,
representing the pairs of data, ln(box size) and ln(box count). Regressing
ln(box count) on ln(box size) using these twelve data points gives the straight
line pictured on the graph. This line has a slope of -1.0354. Using the
equation above, we take the negative of the slope of the regression line as the
fractal dimension. Thus the fractal dimension for Colombia is 1.0354. Finally,
for the purposes of our analysis, we calculate a fractal index for each country,
which is the log of the fractal dimension. Returning to our example, since
the fractal dimension of Colombia is 1.0354, the fractal index for Colombia is
ln(1.0354) = 0.0348.
3.2 Properties
A measure of the straightness or squiggliness of country borders ideally exhibits
several properties. One desirable property is scale-invariance, meaning the ideal
measure should not di⁄er systematically for large or small countries. Scale-
invariance also means we should be able to apply our measure to a particular
10country and get consistent results regardless of the scale of the analysis for that
country. Our measure is indeed scale invariant.6
A second desirable property of a ￿squiggliness￿ measure is the degree to
which it measures larger-scale irregularities as opposed to smaller-scale irreg-
ularities. Small-scale deviations from a smooth curve or line may well be the
result of how ethnic considerations or other local politics determined whether a
particular parcel of land should be on one side of a border or another. Since we
are interested in comparing borders where local and ethnic considerations were
taken into account, with more "arti￿cial" borders, we prefer our measure to fo-
cus on these small-scale irregularities, rather than measuring the overall shape
of a country. Unlike measures such as this circumscribed/inscribed circle ratio,
the fractal measure emphasizes the small-scale variation that we are interested
in measuring.
We also prefer a measure that treats straight lines and very smooth but
slowly curving lines as similar. Most arbitrarily-drawn borders are straight lines,
but we are also interested in a continuum of less-to-more-meandering borders,
none of which are perfectly straight lines. Given this, it would be good to avoid
a discontinuous change in our measure when moving from a rectangular shape
to a smoothly curved shape. As it turns out, there is no discontinuity in the
fractal measure, when moving from a perfectly straight line to a smooth curve.
Finally, and most importantly, we would like a measure which allows us to
consider only part of the border at a time. In particular, we will disregard
coastlines, since they are determined by nature and not by politics, and may be
highly non-compact. The fractal measure can be applied to selected portions
of the border, such as just the political boundaries. Most other measures of
compactness must use the entire boundary, including coastlines. For instance
other common compactness measures include: the ratio of the longest axis to
the maximum perpendicular length; the ratio of the minimum shape diameter
to the maximum diameter; various ratios among the area of the shape, the area
of an inscribing circle and the area of a circumscribing circle; the moment of
inertia of the shape; and the ratio of the area of the shape to the area of a circle
with the same perimeter.7 All of these measures require a closed shape in order
to be calculated.
6To be precise our measure is not 100 percent scale invariant, but it is close to scale
invarient. Analyzing a country when at di⁄ering degrees of being ￿zoomed in￿ or ￿zoomed
out￿may yield slightly di⁄erent values for the fractal dimension. However, these numbers do
not vary greatly for each county and the relative rankings of countries are maintained. More
importantly, our measure allows us to consistently compare large and small countries. By
using the same set of 12 box-sizes (as measured in degrees latitude and longitude) for each
country, our analysis for each country is on the same ￿human￿scale as for the other countries.
By contrast other measures of compactness, such as the ratio of the area of a circumscribed
and an inscribed circle for the country border, may di⁄er systematically for large and small
countries.
7For more on this, see Niemi, Grofman, Carlucci, and Hofeller. (1990) and Flaherty, and
Crumplin. (1992).
113.3 Partitioned groups and other measures
Our second new measure focus on the speci￿c issue of borders cutting across an
ethnic group and dividing it into two adjacent countries. This variable is de￿ned
as the percent of the population of a country that belongs to a partitioned group.
In turn, a partitioned group is one that appear in two or more adjacent countries.
One possible objection to this variable is mobility of people. If members of
the same ethnic groups wanted to be together they could move into the same
country. However mobility of people is often not free and many countries may
prevent entry (or in some cases exit). We calculate the fractal variable for 144
non-island countries. Islands have no political boundaries, so they cannot have
a political boundary fractal dimension. The partitioned variable is calculated
for 131 countries, including 117 countries for which both indices are available.
The literature of ethno linguistic fractionalization has normally focused on
one index of fractionalization, the Her￿ndhal index which captures the proba-
bility that two randomly drawn individuals from the population of the country
belong to di⁄erent groups.8 The original index was based on a linguistic classi-
￿cation of groups from a Soviet source (Atlas Narodv Mira). It was originally
used in the economic development literature by Mauro (1995) Easterly and
Levine (1997) and it is if often referred to as Elf (Ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion) index. Alesina and al. (2003) proposed another index that in addition
to linguistic di⁄erences includes di⁄erences based on other characteristic such
as skin color. They label it Frcat but to avoid confusion we label is in the
present paper Elfn1(See Alesina and al. (2003) for more discussion about the
construction of this variable)
How do our new measures, FRACTAL and PARTITIONED, relate to each
other and to the previously used index of fractionalization? Our fractal measure
is meant to capture a much broader idea than ethnic fractionalization. However,
arti￿cial states as proxied by our measure may end up including di⁄erent ethnic
groups within the same political borders, and therefore there should be some
correlation between the Her￿ndhal index of fractionalization and our fractal
measure. Similar consideration apply for the portioned variable.
Table 2 displays the correlation coe¢ cients between the two measures of
arti￿cial borders and the more traditional measure of ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization. Several comments are in order. First note how the partition variable
is positively correlated with the index of ethnic fractionalization, but the corre-
lation is in the order of 0.5 so clearly these are "di⁄erent variables". Given the
way the two variables are constructed it is not surprising that they are positively
correlated but they indeed capture di⁄erent things. Second the fractal variable
is correlated with the Elf and Elf1 measures (with the appropriate negative sign,
less curvy borders is associated with more fractionalization), but the correla-
tion is not very high especially with Elf, while it is -0.22 with Elf1. Third the
correlation between our partitioned variable and our fractal variable is basically
zero. This was frankly a surprise to us. It suggests arti￿cial states are not
easy to summarize with one measure. (For example, the partitioned variable
8Another index frequenlty used is a polarization index suggested by RRRR
12captures only one of the problematic features of arti￿cial states mentioned in
the introduction.) We use both measures as providing independent informa-
tion on "arti￿ciality." Finally, Elf and Elf1 are highly correlated but are not
statistically identical. In summary are two new measure are di⁄erent from each
other and are not very highly correlated with other measures previously used in
the literature of ethnic fractionalization.
3.4 Data and sources
Data for determining the fractal dimension for each country￿ s political boundary
comes from the GIS (Geographic Information Systems) format data set World
Vector Shoreline. This data set is the largest scale digital data set of political
boundaries available today. The data is based on work done by the U.S. mili-
tary in the early 1990￿ s. The non-coastline borders for each country are isolated
using ArcGIS software9. This data is then changed to a raster (digitized) for-
mat and then to a ￿tif￿format. With a few minor modi￿cations, the software
program ImageJ 10 calculates the box-count/ box-size data for twelve di⁄erent
box-sizes; the smallest box-size corresponds to the smallest scale of the raster
data exported from GIS (approximately 0.001 degrees latitude or longitude). A
fractal dimension is calculated for each country using this data, ranging from
1.000 to 1.100. Finally, we take logs of the fractal dimension to achieve a fractal
index, which ranges from 0 to 0.10.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Which states are "arti￿cial"?
Table 3 lists our measures for all the countries in our sample. To illustrate which
states are most arti￿cial according to both measures, we took countries that
were in the top third of PARTITIONED and in the bottom third of FRACTAL
(the straightest borders). Given the weak correlation between the two measures,
there were not that many countries in both ￿13 to be exact. These ￿most arti￿-
cial￿states are Chad, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guatemala, Jordan,
Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Pakistan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. These exam-
ples accord with what we know of the historical process that led to formation
of these states (some of it described above).
What about the US and Canada? Their border is a straight line most of the
way, are they arti￿cial states ? According to our measures yes they do score
relatively in terms of how arti￿cial they are, which is certainly not consistent
with a view of arti￿cial as failed states, One may notice that this a case in
which borders were drawn before many pole actually moved in. In many ways
9ArcGIS 9.0 Desktop software from ESRI; www.esri.com
10Available online at http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/download.html and at
http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/developer/index.html
13the same applies to US states: in the west, their borders drawn when they were
close to deserted are often straight lines. On the contrary borders of East coast
states, drawn earlier with more population are less straight.11
4.2 Economic and Political Success
We now turn to verifying whether these new measures of arti￿cial states are
correlated with economic and institutional success. We consider three groups
of variables as left hand side variables. (See Table 3 for variable de￿nitions
and sources). First, the variables that measures economic or economic policy
success: (log of) per capita income in 2002; an index of economic freedom in 2005
that measures adherence to a free market economic system; and an alternative
index of economic freedom averaged over 1970-2002.12 Second, we look at
poltico-institutional variables: voice and accountability (which measure checks
on power), political stability and violence, government e⁄ectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and corruption. Third, we use quality of life and public
goods delivery-related measures: infant mortality in 2001, literacy rate averaged
over the period 1995 2002; measles immunization rate in 2002; immunization
rate against DPT in 2002, percent of population with access to clean water, in
2000. 13 We choose these variables as representative of state performance in
the core public goods areas of health, education, and infrastructure, selecting
particular measures based on which ones have data available for a large sample of
countries. All of these variable are clearly correlated with each other. Obviously
rich country have lower infant mortality, more clean water etc. Table 4 reports
a correlation chart between all of these variables: the correlations are not all
very close to 1 (or -1 depending on the variable de￿nition). That is, this set of
variables do capture di⁄erent aspects of politico-economic development that are
di⁄erent from each other, so there is information provided by considering all of
them.
Table 5 presents the basic univariate regressions of our measures of arti￿cial
states. Consider line one: the left hand side variable is the log of per capita GDP
in 2002, and we report only the coe¢ cient and the p value of the single right
hand side variable. (Obviously we include also a constant in the regression).
Each line represents the same regressions with a di⁄erent left hand side variable
which is listed in the ￿rst column. We use all the observations available, and
their number varies (from 84 to 144) in di⁄erent regressions because of data
11Needless to say US and Canada are included in our regressions below.
12We use the second measure as a robustness check on the ￿rst measure of economic freedom,
since each is based on a complicated mix of indicators and may re￿ect some subjectivity. Given
the uncertainty surrounding this measure, we also check robustness with respect to using a
long period average of the second measure rather than just a single year, which may average
out data errors and noise (while sacri￿cing our preferred approach of using the most recent
datapoint available).
13Data on literacy is spotty, with di⁄erent countries reporting di⁄erent years over 1995-
2002, so we average all available data over this period. Otherwise, the year given is the most
recent for which data are widely available.
14availability on the left hand side variable. The dependent variables are divided in
three blocs: economic variables, institutional variables and quality of life/public
goods variables. Notice that because of how the right hand side variables are
constructed, we expect the opposite sign in the ￿rst and second column. So for
instance in the ￿rst line we expect a negative correlation of economic success
measured as income per capita in countries where the partition variable assumes
a lower value, and in countries where the measure of how straight borders are
assumes a higher value. The coe¢ cient in bold represents all the cases in which
statistical signi￿cance (with the expected sign of course) is 5 per cent or better;
marginally signi￿cant coe¢ cient at the 10 per cent level or better are indicated
with a "+" sign . Of the 28 coe¢ cients in the ￿rst two columns, 20 are
statistically signi￿cant (5 per cent or better) and there are borderline (p value
0.10 or better). Our two measures are not highly correlated with each other
and in fact as discussed above, they capture di⁄erent aspects of the nature of
borders. For this reason there is no reason why they could not be used in the
same regressions. In the third column, we use them both. IN all regressions
at least one is signi￿cant at the 5 per cent level or better and in almost all
regressions they are either both statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve per cent level
or one is and the other is borderline.
Table 6 displays information on the size of the impact of these measures of
arti￿cial states, which is considerable. For the partitioned variable, going from
the 75th most partitioned country to the 25th most partititioned country is
associated with an increase of 83% in GDP per capita (0.832 log-points; Table
6, Column 2). Many of the other variables are also strongly a⁄ected, by around
half of a standard deviation (Column 3). The impact of the fractal variable is
smaller but still signi￿cant in size. Moving from the 75th most squiggly border
to the 25th most squiggly border is associated with a 37% increase in GDP per
capita. The other dependent variables are also a⁄ected by about a third of a
standard deviation.
We now check whether these strong univariate correlations survive adding
other exogenous variables to the right hand side. We begin with ethnic frac-
tionalization to see whether our new measure add anything to traditional and
already used measures of ethic fractionalization. In Table 9 we add as a con-
trol in the right hand side the variable ELF, the "traditional" ethnolinguistic
fractionalization variable used by Easterly and Levine (1997) and by many after
them. In the case of our FRACTAL measure, the result suggests that in about
half the regressions (6 out of 14) both variables are statistically signi￿cant, in
another one FRAXCTAL is marginal at the 10 per cent level . In particular, for
the institutional regressions, FRACTAL remains signi￿cant when controlling
for ELF. For the other regressions, ELF is signi￿cant but FRACTAL is not.
Consider now column 1. Here the variable PARTITIONED remains signi￿cant
in 7 out of 14 regressions. For GDP per capita, PARTITIONED remains sig-
ni￿cant when controlling for ELF. Column 3 shows our results when we include
both variables and control for ELF. Of the 28 coe¢ cients on our arti￿cial states
variables (from the 14 regressions), 16 are signi￿cant at a the 5 per cent level
or greater and 9 are borderline at the 10 per cent level.
15The next experiment is about former colonial status. As we discussed in
section 2 above, much of the problem of arti￿cial states has to do with colo-
nizers drawing borders which did not respect indigenous divisions. In fact, the
FRACTAL index for former colonies is lower than for non-former colonies, with
the index averages equal to 0.0335 and 0.0435 for these two groups respectively.
This di⁄erence is signi￿cant at the 1% level. The overall standard deviation
for the fractal index is about 0.02, so this is an important di⁄erence of about
half a standard deviation between former colonies and non-colonies. Likewise,
for the PARTITION variable, former colonies and non-colonies di⁄er by 13.6
out of the 100 point scale; former colonies have higher proportions citizens from
"partitioned" ethnic groups. This di⁄erence is also signi￿cant at the 1% level.
But having been a colony or not may in￿ uence political and economic outcomes
in many di⁄erent ways, so it is important to check that controlling for colonial
status does not change all the signi￿cance of our variables of interest. We do
that in Table 8 where we add a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if
the country has never been a colony. In column 1 note how 11 out of the 14
coe¢ cients on the partition variable are now signi￿cant at the 5 per cent level
and all the others except one are borderline. For the fractal measure, however,
only 1 out of 14 is and one is borderline. This show that it is di¢ cult to iden-
tify separately the e⁄ect of colonial status and straight-line borders, since one
led to the other. For the regressions with both variables, about half of the 28
coe¢ cients are signi￿cant.
Another important exogenous factor that can explain economic and polit-
ical success is geography and climate. Many geographic variables have been
suggested in the literature. One of the most precise in capturing weather pat-
tern is the variable climate de￿ned as the percentage of a country￿ s cultivatable
land that is in the Koppen-Geiger Climate Zone A, which is a humid climate
with no winter. This is a classical de￿nition of what constitutes a tropical area.
In Table 9 we add this variable to our regression. Our variables are generally
quite robust much more so than the ELF variable.
4.3 Other robustness checks
We consider a number of other possible explanations for our results, adding
further controls that might otherwise have introduced a spurious correlation
with our measures of arti￿ciality of states. In order to keep the length of this
paper manageable, we simply summarize the results here in the text. A separate
appendix with the full results will be available on our web sites.
First, we include the index of ethnic fractionalization ELF1, from Alesina
et al. (2003), in place of the control variable ELF. The results are slightly less
strong, especially for the fractal measure, but the results for GDP and several
health indicators remain strong. We then control for the percent of a country￿ s
land area that is desert. Borders may be more likely to be straight in deserts,
and desert itself might in￿ uence our dependent variables of interest. However,
controlling for desert leaves our results basically una⁄ected.
Another possible concern is to what extent our results re￿ ect outcomes
16mainly in Africa. We have mixed feelings about introducing an African dummy
variable into our regressions. On one hand, we are concerned that the Africa
dummy is not truly exogenous because the decision to introduce an African
dummy is in￿ uenced by the knowledge of poor outcomes in the endogenous
variables in Africa (even the conventional de￿nition of Africa as being countries
below the Sahara has likely been in￿ uenced by the di⁄ering outcomes in North
Africa and sub-Saharan Africa). On the other hand, it is clearly of interest
to see whether our results are heavily in￿ uenced by the sub-Saharan African
observations of very arti￿cial borders and very poor outcomes. The results are
de￿nitely weakened by including the Africa dummy, which is always signi￿cant.
The only result to survive with FRACTAL is for democracy (still signi￿cant
at the 5 percent level). More of the results on PARTITIONED survive, with
the result on per capita income level, literacy, measles immunization, and DPT
immunization still signi￿cant at the 5 percent level, and corruption, clean water,
and infant mortality still signi￿cant at the 10 percent level.
Finally, we control for two other important characteristics of countries that
might be related to the nature of the borders (and thus possibly causing a spu-
rious correlation with arti￿cial borders): population density and the land area
of the country. Population density is sometimes signi￿cant in our regressions,
but leaves the results on PARTITIONED and FRACTAL basically unchanged.
Land area is often signi￿cant and has some e⁄ect on the FRACTAL results, but
little e⁄ect on the PARTITIONED results.
4.3.1 Borders and Wars
One type of variable is conspicuously missing in our analysis: wars, both inter-
national and civil. Our reason for not discussing it at length is that we found
no e⁄ects of arti￿cial borders on war. We did ￿nd an e⁄ect of arti￿cial borders
on a subjective measure of political instability and violence, as described above,
but clearly it would be desirable to study the objective outbreaks of wars in
addition to this variable.
The lack of an immediate and strong evidence of a correlation between bor-
ders and wars surprised us (although it echoes similar non-results in the liter-
ature on ethnic diversity and war). We are not ready to conclude that ethnic
rivalries and border disputes are unrelated to wars: we believe that more work
is needed. For international war, there is ￿rst of all the international system
(mentioned for Africa in the introduction) that has tended to support existing
borders no matter how arti￿cial. These international conventions are more bind-
ing in some regions than others. Second, to study international wars properly,
we need to study pairs of countries and to study to what extent the probability
of war between them depends on whether the border dividing adjacent ones is
arti￿cial. There are clearly some examples of border wars arising from partition,
such as Israel and its neighbors, India and Pakistan, and Eritrea and Ethiopia.
To what extent these examples are validated by a systematic association requires
a study that uses pairwise data on war outbreaks that is beyond the scope of
this paper. For civil wars, a more detailed analysis would also require some
17attention to the nature of arti￿cial states, especially ￿nding some objective way
of measuring whether previously hostile groups were combined into one state.
The level of further work required for both civil and international war would
unduly extend the length of this paper, so we plan a subsequent paper (not yet
done) in which we focus exclusively on arti￿cial states and war.
5 Conclusions
The idea of "failed states" is a recurrent them both in newspapers and within
academia. The borders of many countries have been the result of processes that
have little to do with the desire of people to be together or not. In some cases
groups who wanted to be separate have been thrown into the same political
unit; others have been divided by arti￿cial borders. Former colonizers have
been mainly responsible for such mistakes, but the botched agreements after
the two major wars of the last century have also played a role.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide two new measures meant
to capture how "arti￿cial" political borders are. One measure considers how
straight land borders are, under the assumption that straight borders are more
like to be arti￿cial and less likely to follow geographic features or the evolution
of hundreds of years of border design. The second measure focuses on ethnic
or linguistic groups separated by borders. We have then investigated whether
these variables are correlated with the politico-economic success of various coun-
tries, and we found that indeed they are. The general patterns of correlations
that we presented in a battery of tables suggest that these two new measures
do quite well in cross-country regressions in which other exogenous measures of
geography, ethnic fragmentation and colonial status are controlled for. We have
also explored the correlation of our measures of arti￿cial borders with the occur-
rence of civil and international wars and our results are inconclusive. While we
￿nd correlations of our variables with measure of political instability and lack
of democracy, we do not ￿nd a clear pattern of correlations with wars. Further
research is needed on this point looking at bilateral data on wars, namely which
country engaged in war with whom.
Probably the single most important issue that we have not addressed is
that of migrations. One consequences of arti￿cial borders is that people may
want to move, if they can. Often movement of peoples is not permitted by
various government but migration certainly occur. In some cases migrations that
respond to arti￿cial borders may be partly responsible for economic costs, wars,
dislocation of people, refugee crises and a hots of undesirable circumstances.
Thus, the need to migrate, created by the wrong borders may be one reason why
arti￿cial borders are ine¢ cient. But sometimes the movement of people may
correct for the arti￿cial nature of borders. This dynamic aspects of movement of
people and migrations, and changes of borders for that matter is not considered
in this paper in which we consider a static picture of the world.
The bottom line in this paper is that the arti￿cial borders bequeathed by
colonizers are a signi￿cant hindrance to the political and economic development
18of the independent states that followed the colonies.
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Figure 1a – France, with poltical boundaries highlighted at left 
Figure 1b – Sudan, with poltical boundaries highlighted at left 
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Figure 2g: Fractal Dimension Calculation 
 
  23Figure 3 – Calculation of the Fractal Dimension of Columbia’s Border 
 
 
























 regression line 
(slope = -1.0354)
  24Table 1 – Fractal Dimension Calculation
 
 
Straight Line (Figures 1a and 1b) 
box size  box count  ln (box size)  ln (box count) 
1 48  0.000  3.871 
2 24  0.693  3.178 
      
Regression coeff:  Fractal Number: 
-1.000 1.000 
      
      
Very Squiggly Line (Figures 1c and 1d) 
box size  box count  ln (box size)  ln (box count) 
1 704  0.000  6.557 
2 176  0.693  5.170 
      
Regression coeff:  Fractal Number: 
-2.000 2.000 
      
      
Squiggly Line (Figures 1e and 1f) 
box size  box count  ln (box size)  ln (box count) 
1 130  0.000  4.868 
2 54  0.693  3.989 
      
Regression coeff:  Fractal Number: 
-1.267 1.267 
 

















Partitioned index  1          
Basic fractal index  0.0554  1       
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (elf) 
index - 1960 
0.5245  -0.1001  1    
Alesina-Easterly 
fractionalization index 
(ADEKW 2003 paper) 
0.5152  -0.2168  0.766  1 
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Table 3 – Data sources 
 
Table 3: Variable definitions 
 
code 3-letter World Bank country code 
 
Ethnic/ variables 
partitionedc      Percent of population belonging to groups partitioned by a border 
lnfractal905   log of basic fractal index (latest revision as of September 2005) based onWorld  
      Vector Shoreline Dataset (GIS format) 
lnsmallfractal   log of “small country” fractal index (used only in robustness checks) 
elf60      Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1960 (as used in Easterly and Levine 1997) 
frac        Ethnic fractionalization (from Alesina et al. 2003) 
 
Political variables 
noncolonial      dummy =1 if never colonized by European power 
 
Kaufmann-Kraay indices of institutions for 2004 (increase means better institutions): 
 
voice  democracy,   checks on power, accountability to population 
polstab     political stability and violence 
govteff     government effectiveness 
regqual     regulatory quality 
rulelaw      rule of law 
corrupt      corruption 
 
Economic variables 
lpcy2002  log per capita income in 2002 (Summers-Heston updated with World Bank per 
capita growth rates) 
ief2005  Index of Economic Freedom, 2005 (increase means less freedom) from Heritage 
Foundation 
efw19702002    Economic Freedom in the World, average 1970-2002, from the Fraser Institute 
 
Quality of life and public goods variables 
infmort2001     Infant mortality rate in 2001 (WDI) 
literacy9502      Literacy rate averaged over available data 1995-2002 (EDI) 
measlesimm02    Measles immunization rate, 2002 (WDI) 
dptimm02      Immunization rate against DPT, 2002 (WDI) 
water2000     Percent of population with access to clean water, 2000 (WDI) 
 
Geography variables 
cultca      percent of cultivated land in Koppen-Geiger climate zone A  
      (humid climate with no winter) 
      Source: Sachs (199X), Center for International Development, Harvard  
cultcb      percent of cultivated land in Koppen-Geiger climate zone B  
      (dry climate with no winter)  
      Source: Sachs (199X), Center for International Development, Harvard 
      Note: cultca and cultcb included separatly as controls 
kg_a_bw, desert  Percent of total land area in Koppen_Geiger climate zone BW (desert) 
      Source: Sachs (199X), Center for International Development, Harvard 
areakm2    Total land area in kilometers squared 
      Source: Sachs (199X), Center for International Development, Harvard 
pdenpavg    Population density experienced by the typical citizen (population density of many 
      small regions is totaled, but using the population of each region as a weight) 
      Source: Sachs (199X), Center for International Development, Harvard 28
Table 4 – Correlations Among our Principle Dependent Variables 
 
Econonic Variables 
Log GDP per 
capita, 2002 
Index of Econ 
Freedom, 
2005 (higher 
= less free) 
Economic 
Freedom in the 
World, avg 
1970-2002          
Log GDP per capita, 2002  1                
Index of Econ Freedom, 2005 (higher = less free)  -0.7078  1             
Economic Freedom in the World, avg 1970-2002  0.7431  -0.7494  1          
                    
                    

















2002    
Literacy rate, avg of available data 1995-2002  1                
Percent pop with access to clean water, 2000  0.5105  1             
Infant mortality, 2001  -0.7074  -0.6835  1          
Measles immunization rate, 2002  0.6743  0.5771  -0.6975  1       
DPT immunization rate, 2002  0.6666  0.6079  -0.7461  0.8956  1    
                    













law  Corruption 
Voice - checks on power  1                
Political stability and violence  0.7306  1             
Government effectiveness  0.7197  0.7858  1          
Regulatory quality  0.8147  0.8034  0.9092  1       
Rule of law  0.8035  0.8791  0.9315  0.9244  1    
Corruption  0.7412  0.7993  0.9564  0.8898  0.9496  1 
 Table 5 – OLS regressions with no controls
 
 
Dependent variables:  Coefficient on: 
1 2 3 
PARTITIONED  -0.021**  -0.019** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
FRACTAL   11.49*  10.23
+ Log GDP per capita, 2002 
    (0.041)  (0.083) 
PARTITIONED  0.006*  0.005* 
   (0.013)  (0.028) 
FRACTAL    -6.12
+ -7.54* 
Index of Econ Freedom, 
2005 (higher = less free) 
     (0.080)  (0.031) 
PARTITIONED  -0.009*    -0.008* 
   (0.029)    (0.037) 
FRACTAL    5.70 9.80 
Economic 
variables 
Economic Freedom in the 
World, avg  1970-2002 
     (0.369) (0.142) 
PARTITIONED  -0.01**  -0.01** 
   (0.003)  (0.002) 
FRACTAL   13.16**  14.66** 
Voice - checks on power 
    (0.002)  (0.002) 
PARTITIONED  -0.009**    -0.01** 
   (0.008)    (0.001) 
FRACTAL    5.79 7.26 
Political stability and 
violence 
  
     (0.199) (0.151) 
PARTITIONED  -0.01**   -0.011** 
   (0.002)  (0.000) 
FRACTAL    9.57
+ 11.46* 
Government effectiveness 
     (0.062)  (0.042) 
PARTITIONED  -0.01**   -0.011** 
   (0.003)  (0.000) 
FRACTAL   11.23*  12.93* 
Regulatory quality 
    (0.016)  (0.011) 
PARTITIONED  -0.011**  -0.012** 
   (0.001)  (0.000) 
FRACTAL    8.33
+ 9.43
+ Rule of law 
     (0.099) (0.092) 
PARTITIONED  -0.011**    -0.011** 
   (0.001)    (0.001) 






     (0.106) (0.079) 
PARTITIONED  -0.442**  -0.441** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
FRACTAL   290.6*  393.5** 
Literacy rate, avg of 
available data 1995-2002 
    (0.029)  (0.000) 
PARTITIONED  -0.261**  -0.267** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 




Percent pop with access  
to clean water, 2000 
  
    (0.021)  (0.100) 
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PARTITIONED  0.702**  0.774** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
FRACTAL   -548.0**  -556.5** 
Infant mortality, 2001 
    (0.001)  (0.002) 
PARTITIONED  -0.317**    -0.379** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
FRACTAL    94.8 110.2
+
Measles immunization  
rate, 2002 
  
     (0.13) (0.061) 
PARTITIONED  -0.323**    -0.375** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
FRACTAL    190.5** 214.5** 
DPT immunization rate, 
2002 
  
     (0.009) (0.006) 
 
P values in parenthesis; 
+
 * ** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 refer, respectivly, to groups of regressions using PARTITIONED, FRACTAL, or both variables. 
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Table 6 – Impact of Partitioned and Fractal Variables 
 
PARTITIONED index (high value ~ artificial state):   FRACTAL index (low value ~ artificial state):
25
th percentile = 33
rd country = VNM (Vietnam): 2.8  25
th percentile = 33
rd country = Isreal (including WB border): 0.0498 
75
th percentile = 98
th country = LVA (Latvia): 42.4    75
th percentile = 98




deviation of  
dependent 
variable 




percentile in the 
PARTITIONED 
Index (coeff * 39.6) 
Impact of 
PARTITIONED 
/ std dev of dep 
variable 




percentile in the 
FRACTAL Index 




deviation of dep. 
variable 
Log GDP per capita, 2002  1.141 0.832  0.73  0.374  0.33 
Index of Econ Freedom, 
2005 (higher = less free)  0.720 -0.238  0.33  -0.222  0.31 
Economic Freedom in the 
World, avg  1970-2002  0.998 0.356  0.36  0.272  0.27 
Voice - checks on power  1.000 0.396  0.40  0.393  0.39 
Political stability and 
violence  1.000 0.356  0.36  0.181  0.18 
Government effectiveness  1.000 0.396  0.40  0.324  0.32 
Regulatory quality  1.000 0.396  0.40  0.355  0.36 
Rule of law  1.000 0.436  0.44  0.282  0.28 
Corruption  1.000 0.436  0.44  0.297  0.30 
Literacy rate, avg of 
available data 1995-2002  21.180 17.503  0.83  7.132  0.34 
Percent pop with access to 
clean water, 2000  20.601 10.336  0.50  7.012  0.34 
Infant mortality, 2001  41.825 -27.799  0.66  -16.023  0.38 
Measles immunization rate, 
2002  17.049 12.553  0.74  2.851  0.17 
DPT immunization rate, 
2002  18.445 12.791  0.69  5.654  0.31 
 
  
Table 7 – Controlling for ethno-linguistic fractionalization (elf60) 
 
 
Dependent variables:  Coefficient on:  1 2 3 
PARTITIONED  -0.016**     -0.018** 
   (0.003)     (0.000) 
FRACTAL     10.555  16.284* 
      (0.112)  (0.010) 
ELF60  -0.013** -0.021**  -0.01* 
Log GDP per capita, 
2002 
   (0.010) (0.000) (0.046) 
PARTITIONED  0.003    0.003 
   (0.358)     (0.365) 
FRACTAL     -6.47  -7.927
+
      (0.121)  (0.056) 
ELF60  0.007* 0.008** 0.007* 
Index of Econ Freedom, 
2005 (higher = less free) 
   (0.018) (0.000) (0.048) 
PARTITIONED  -0.007    -0.008 
   (0.196)     (0.106) 
FRACTAL     8.916  15.517* 
      (0.176)  (0.018) 
ELF60 -0.006  -0.009**  -0.004 
Economic 
variables 
Economic Freedom in 
the World, avg  1970-
2002 
   (0.19)  (0.002)  (0.377) 
PARTITIONED -0.008
+    -0.01* 
   (0.095)     (0.029) 
FRACTAL     14.21** 17.728** 
      (0.008) (0.003) 
ELF60  -0.008* -0.01** -0.006 
Voice - checks on power 
   (0.046) (0.002) (0.168) 
PARTITIONED -0.007      -0.009
+
   (0.146)     (0.060) 
FRACTAL     11.88* 16.01** 
      (0.032) (0.009) 
ELF60  -0.009* -0.012** -0.007 
Political stability and 
violence 
   (0.047) (0.001) (0.128) 
PARTITIONED -0.008      -0.009
+
   (0.121)     (0.051) 
FRACTAL     13.52* 17.59* 
      (0.040) (0.012) 




   (0.020) (0.001) (0.066) 
PARTITIONED -0.008      -0.01* 
   (0.101)     (0.043) 
FRACTAL     14.55** 17.94** 
      (0.009) (0.005) 





   (0.035) (0.000) (0.117) 
  32PARTITIONED -0.008      -0.009
+
   (0.143)     (0.074) 
FRACTAL     13.40* 16.74* 
      (0.035) (0.013) 
ELF60  -0.012** -0.014** -0.011* 
Rule of law 
   (0.008) (0.000) (0.034) 
PARTITIONED -0.008      -0.008
+
   (0.125)     (0.062) 
FRACTAL     13.81* 17.09** 
      (0.026) (0.007) 
ELF60  -0.013** -0.014** -0.011* 
Corruption 
   (0.004) (0.000) (0.015) 
PARTITIONED  -0.38**     -0.396** 
   (0.000)     (0.001) 
FRACTAL     204.7  325.6
+
      (0.254)  (0.051) 
ELF60  -0.154* -0.271** -0.128 
Literacy rate, avg of 
available data 1995-
2002 
   (0.032) (0.001) (0.122) 
PARTITIONED -0.173
+    -0.152
+
   (0.052)     (0.067) 
FRACTAL     88.79  8.58 
      (0.538)  (0.948) 
ELF60  -0.226** -0.27** -0.224** 
Percent pop with access 
to clean water, 2000 
   (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) 
PARTITIONED  0.426*     0.452* 
   (0.032)     (0.024) 
FRACTAL     -380.3
+ -497.8
+
      (0.068)  (0.060) 
ELF60  0.752** 0.861** 0.687** 
Infant mortality, 2001 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
PARTITIONED  -0.27**     -0.288** 
   (0.000)     (0.000) 
FRACTAL     -41.841  42.992 
      (0.602)  (0.634) 
ELF60  -0.157** -0.297** -0.166* 
Measles immunization 
rate, 2002 
   (0.009) (0.000) (0.012) 
PARTITIONED  -0.206**     -0.242** 
   (0.003)     (0.001) 
FRACTAL     99.039  188.871
+
      (0.278)  (0.084) 






DPT immunization rate, 
2002 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
 
P values in parenthesis; 
+
 * ** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 refer, respectivly, to groups of regressions using PARTITIONED, FRACTAL, or both variables. 
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Table 8 – Controlling for elf60 and former colonial status 
 
 
Dependent variables:  Coefficient on:  1 2 3 
PARTITIONED  -0.016**     -0.016** 
   (0.000)     (0.000) 
FRACTAL     5.918  7.406
+
      (0.324)  (0.095) 
ELF60 -0.003  -0.014**  -0.002 
   (0.481)  (0.001)  (0.654) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.426** 1.099** 1.474** 
Log GDP per capita, 
2002 
   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
PARTITIONED  0.004    0.003 
   (0.165)     (0.367) 
FRACTAL     -3.965  -3.546 
      (0.269)  (0.305) 
ELF60 0.002  0.004
+ 0.002 
    (0.570) (0.085) (0.587) 
NON-COLONIAL  -0.739** -0.607** -0.785** 
Index of Econ Freedom, 
2005 (higher = less free) 
   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
PARTITIONED -0.007
+    -0.006 
   (0.086)     (0.150) 
FRACTAL     2.042  6.819 
      (0.678)  (0.162) 
ELF60  0.002 -0.003 0.003 
    (0.587) (0.276) (0.530) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.133** 1.145** 1.228** 
Economic 
variables 
Economic Freedom in the 
World, avg  1970-2002 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PARTITIONED  -0.007*     -0.008* 
   (0.032)     (0.0360 
FRACTAL     10.40
+ 10.67
+
      (0.053)  (0.0930 
ELF60 0  -0.005  0 
    (0.988) (0.124) (0.952) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.255** 0.847** 1.149** 
Voice - checks on power 
   (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
PARTITIONED -0.007
+    -0.007
+
   (0.065)     (0.081) 
FRACTAL     7.572  8.161 
      (0.121)  (0.121) 
ELF60 -0.001  -0.006  0 
    (0.849) (0.115) (0.923) 




Political stability and 
violence 
   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
  34PARTITIONED  -0.008*     -0.007
+
   (0.043)     (0.073) 
FRACTAL     7.68  7.796 
      (0.153)  (0.161) 
ELF60  -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
    (0.816) (0.152) (0.891) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.526** 1.30** 1.594** 
Government 
effectiveness 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PARTITIONED  -0.008*     -0.007
+
   (0.044)     (0.067) 
FRACTAL     9.977*  9.814
+
      (0.040)  (0.077) 
ELF60 0  -0.006
+ 0 
    (0.912) (0.075) (0.954) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.343** 1.018** 1.322** 
Regulatory quality 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PARTITIONED  -0.007*     -0.006
+
   (0.048)     (0.099) 
FRACTAL     7.295  6.553 
      (0.148)  (0.192) 
ELF60 -0.002  -0.006
+ -0.002 
    (0.611) (0.098) (0.706) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.576** 1.358** 1.658** 
Rule of law 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PARTITIONED  -0.007*     -0.006
+
   (0.045)     (0.089) 
FRACTAL     7.76  7.214 
      (0.120)  (0.148) 
ELF60 -0.003  -0.006*  -0.002 
   (0.437)  (0.045)  (0.504) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.533** 1.346** 1.608** 
Corruption 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PARTITIONED  -0.373**    -0.388** 
   (0.000)     (0.001) 
FRACTAL     202.8  318.8
+
      (0.259)  (0.060) 
ELF60 -0.135
+ -0.273**  -0.112 
   (0.080)  (0.002)  (0.200) 
NON-COLONIAL  5.712 -0.6 5.518 
Literacy rate, avg of 
available data 1995-2002 
    (0.261) (0.933) (0.269) 
PARTITIONED  -0.171*     -0.144
+
   (0.039)     (0.069) 
FRACTAL     71.76  -12.69 
      (0.608)  (0.911) 
ELF60  -0.173* -0.234** -0.171* 
   (0.044) (0.003) (0.043) 
NON-COLONIAL  10.19*  7.853  11.105* 
Quality of 
life variables 
Percent pop with access 
to clean water, 2000 
   (0.018)  (0.251)  (0.013) 
  35PARTITIONED  0.421*     0.404* 
   (0.022)     (0.035) 
FRACTAL     -270.4  -325.6 
      (0.185)  (0.201) 
ELF60  0.566** 0.719** 0.536* 
   (0.009) (0.000) (0.015) 
NON-COLONIAL  -28.477** -24.45**  -28.02** 
Infant mortality, 2001 
   (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) 
PARTITIONED  -0.27**     -0.287** 
   (0.000)     (0.000) 
FRACTAL     -50.00  38.08 
      (0.549)  (0.660) 
ELF60  -0.159* -0.286** -0.162* 
   (0.018) (0.000) (0.022) 
NON-COLONIAL -0.346  1.846  0.799 
Measles immunization 
rate, 2002 
    (0.924) (0.611) (0.802) 
PARTITIONED  -0.205**     -0.23** 
   (0.002)     (0.002) 
FRACTAL     62.04  146.4 
      (0.489)  (0.157) 
ELF60  -0.225** -0.284** -0.217* 
   (0.008) (0.000) (0.012) 
NON-COLONIAL  7.713* 8.368* 6.915* 
DPT immunization rate, 
2002 
   (0.046) (0.030) (0.049) 
 
P values in parenthesis; 
+
 * ** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively.   
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Dependent variables:  Coefficient on: 
1 2 3 
PARTITIONED  -0.015**     -0.016** 
   (0.000)     (0.000) 
FRACTAL     10.53
+ 10.76* 
      (0.074)  (0.013) 
ELF60 -0.002  -0.013**  -0.001 
   (0.562)  (0.001)  (0.835) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.323**  0.694
+ 1.226** 
   (0.000)  (0.053)  (0.000) 
CLIMATE -0.456
+ -0.813*  -0.531
+
Log GDP per capita, 
2002 
   (0.064)  (0.016)  (0.062) 
PARTITIONED  0.004    0.004 
   (0.193)     (0.282) 
FRACTAL     -6.333
+ -5.122 
      (0.069)  (0.157) 
ELF60  0.001 0.003 0.001 
    (0.722) (0.149) (0.799) 
NON-COLONIAL  -0.709** -0.411*  -0.68** 
   (0.001) (0.049) (0.001) 
CLIMATE 0.196  0.463*  0.239 
Index of Econ Freedom, 
2005 (higher = less free) 
   (0.318)  (0.029)  (0.280) 
PARTITIONED  -0.006    -0.006 
   (0.103)     (0.115) 
FRACTAL     3.982  8.549
+
      (0.416)  (0.069) 
ELF60  0.002 -0.003 0.003 
    (0.574) (0.317) (0.453) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.195** 0.98** 1.103** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CLIMATE -0.116  -0.273  -0.24 
Economic 
variables 
Economic Freedom in 
the World, avg  1970-
2002 
    (0.669) (0.300) (0.377) 
PARTITIONED  -0.007*     -0.009* 
   (0.032)     (0.018) 
FRACTAL     12.59* 13.83* 
      (0.023) (0.038) 
ELF60  0.001 -0.004 0.001 
    (0.871) (0.216) (0.681) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.184** 0.642* 0.942** 
   (0.000) (0.046) (0.006) 
CLIMATE -0.193  -0.56*  -0.448 
Voice - checks on power 
   (0.464)  (0.048)  (0.119) 
PARTITIONED -0.006
+    -0.008* 
   (0.078)     (0.028) 





Political stability and 
violence 
      (0.012) (0.015) 
  37ELF60 0  -0.005  0.001 
    (0.988) (0.203) (0.766) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.17** 0.637*  1.009** 
   (0.000) (0.039) (0.001) 
CLIMATE -0.326  -0.707*  -0.579
+
   (0.274)  (0.016)  (0.060) 
PARTITIONED  -0.007*     -0.008* 
   (0.050)     (0.026) 
FRACTAL     12.49* 12.45* 
      (0.011) (0.019) 
ELF60 0  -0.004  0.001 
    (0.933) (0.299) (0.759) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.42** 0.898**  1.289** 
   (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
CLIMATE  -0.515* -0.916**  -0.66* 
Government 
effectiveness 
   (0.048) (0.001) (0.014) 
PARTITIONED -0.007
+    -0.008* 
   (0.061)     (0.042) 
FRACTAL     12.95** 12.53* 
      (0.006) (0.021) 
ELF60 0  -0.005  0.001 
    (0.990) (0.134) (0.844) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.314** 0.762* 1.144** 
   (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
CLIMATE -0.197  -0.618*  -0.385 
Regulatory quality 
   (0.469)  (0.028)  (0.171) 
PARTITIONED  -0.007*     -0.007* 
   (0.048)     (0.031) 
FRACTAL     12.22** 11.65* 
      (0.009) (0.014) 
ELF60 -0.001  -0.004  0 
    (0.879) (0.201) (0.913) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.428** 0.951** 1.324** 
   (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
CLIMATE  -0.581* -0.911** -0.722** 
Rule of law 
   (0.022) (0.000) (0.005) 
PARTITIONED -0.007
+    -0.007* 
   (0.053)     (0.034) 
FRACTAL     12.28** 11.65* 
      (0.009) (0.019) 
ELF60  -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
    (0.678) (0.108) (0.829) 
NON-COLONIAL  1.418** 0.97** 1.317** 
   (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
CLIMATE  -0.531* -0.853** -0.628** 
Corruption 
   (0.026) (0.001) (0.009) 
PARTITIONED  -0.364**     -0.39** 
   (0.001)     (0.001) 




Literacy rate, avg of 
available data 1995-
2002 
      (0.268)  (0.037) 
  38ELF60 -0.144
+ -0.272**  -0.109 
   (0.068)  (0.003)  (0.197) 
NON-COLONIAL 8.2  -1.326  5.061 
    (0.197) (0.873) (0.371) 
CLIMATE 4.773  0.359  -1.119 
    (0.410) (0.962) (0.837) 
PARTITIONED  -0.163*     -0.160* 
   (0.039)     (0.037) 
FRACTAL     170.6  59.51 
      (0.196)  (0.594) 
ELF60  -0.163* -0.217** -0.156
+




    (0.086) (0.869) (0.079) 
CLIMATE -6.676  -14.72*  -7.662 
Percent pop with access 
to clean water, 2000 
   (0.124)  (0.014)  (0.124) 
PARTITIONED  0.409*     0.419* 
   (0.026)     (0.026) 
FRACTAL     -368.9
+ -385.2 
      (0.051)  (0.100) 
ELF60  0.555** 0.69** 0.512* 
   (0.009) (0.000) (0.016) 
NON-COLONIAL  -28.23**  -16.84  -24.11** 
   (0.008)  (0.109)  (0.009) 
CLIMATE  4.644 14.81 8.447 
Infant mortality, 2001 
    (0.700) (0.243) (0.501) 
PARTITIONED  -0.272**     -0.295** 
   (0.000)     (0.000) 
FRACTAL     0.707  72.339 
      (0.993)  (0.384) 
ELF60  -0.153* -0.272** -0.149* 
   (0.017) (0.000) (0.031) 
NON-COLONIAL 0.142  -2.092  -1.449 
    (0.971) (0.630) (0.700) 
CLIMATE  -3.197 -7.155 -4.856 
Measles immunization 
rate, 2002 
    (0.465) (0.193) (0.283) 
PARTITIONED  -0.202**     -0.249** 
   (0.004)     (0.001) 
FRACTAL     149.8
+ 224.2* 
      (0.065)  (0.030) 
ELF60  -0.21* -0.256**  -0.187* 
   (0.012) (0.000) (0.025) 
NON-COLONIAL 6.08  1.18  1.807 
    (0.169) (0.780) (0.638) 
CLIMATE -5.949  -14.54* -11.04* 
DPT immunization rate, 
2002 
   (0.274)  (0.018) (0.047) 
P values in parenthesis; 
+
 * ** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 refer, respectivly, to groups of regressions using PARTITIONED, FRACTAL, or both variables. 
 
1 Climate is measured as the percentage of cultivatable land in Koppen-Geiger Climate Zone A – humid weather with no winter 
  39